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Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
The Congressional Foray Into the Adoption
Process
BRIAN

D. GALLAGHER*

I. INTRODUCTION

In most litigation involving children, including adoptions, the party
hearing the case (or facilitating the adoption) is required to balance the
interests of child with the interests of the parents.' Congress, however, has
introduced a third party, the tribe,2 in the case of adoptions involving
American Indian3 children.4 The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978'
("ICWA" or "the Act"), adopted for the purpose of protecting "the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families," 6 was passed as a means to remedy "[tihe
* B.S. University of Scranton; J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law. The
author is member of the National Association of Counsel for Children and has previously
published in the area of children's legal rights. He is currently employed by the Metropolitan
Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago.
1. See, e.g., Toby Solomon & James B. Boskey, In Whose Best Interests: Child v.
Parent, N.J. LAW. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 36.
2. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
3. The author recognizes the increasing impropriety of using the term "American
Indian" to describe persons of Native American ancestry. Nonetheless, this term is used in
the interest of maintaining continuity with the legislation which is the topic of this article.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. The issue of adoption based on racial considerations remains indeed controversial.
In fact, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the practice of changing a
child's custody with race as the sole factor to be violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Palmore v. .Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984). Nonetheless,
according to one commentator, the racial classifications inherent in the ICWA remain
unchallenged due to the "unique status of the Indian tribes as self-governing political nations
and because the tribal classification is used to remedy proven past discrimination." Toni H.
Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L.
Rev. 465, 469-70 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1).
6. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7530 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. See also In re Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied sub non.
Catholic Social Servs. v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982) (stating where the state court recognized
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wholesale separation of Indian children from their families... perhaps the7
most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian life today."
Whether this legislation has served its intended goals continues to be
debated by legal scholars and sociologists.' What remains quite clear,
however, is the fact that the ICWA is unique in the manner in which it
9
balances individual and collective rights. Although the conflict between
those parties and courts who seek to avoid implementation of the Act in
their own peculiar circumstances and those who seek strict interpretation
provides the primary focus of this article, any discussion of the ICWA must
be conducted against the backdrop of this distinctive balancing scheme.
While the Indian nations make their own laws in most areas, domestic
relations is one area in which federal authority has significantly affected
tribal autonomy.10 In reviewing this piece of family legislation, it is
essential to note that the Indian nations have always had a special relation11
ship with the American government. The American Indians are the only
"foreign" people singled out in the Constitution." "There has been no
other group about whom the American government has displayed such long

best
that the ICWA "is based on the fundamental assumption that it is in the Indian child's
protected").
be
tribe
interest that its relationship to the
7. HousE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
8. See generally Margaret C. Plantz et al., Indian Child Welfare: A Status Report,
CHILDREN TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 27-29.
9. See generally Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian
Child Welfare Act, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990).
10. Jesse C. Trentadue & Myra A. DeMontigny, The Indian Child Welfare Act of
v.
1978: A Practitioner'sPerspective, 62 N.D. L. REV. 487, 488 (1986). See also Stewart
courts
tribal
while
that
fact
the
(addressing
District Court, 609 P.2d 290, 292 (Mont. 1980)
has
have exclusive jurisdiction over divorces between tribal members, the federal government
matters).
related
over
jurisdiction
some
retain
to
states
allowed
11. A complete dissertation on this special relationship is beyond the scope of this
and the
article. For a more comprehensive treatise on the intercourse between Indian tribes
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term ambivalence and guilt."'13 As a consequence, governmental policy
toward the Indian nations has fluctuated wildly throughout American
history.' 4 While the current trend, as evinced by the ICWA, is to "enhance
tribal identity and autonomy," historically, the federal government sought to
5
assimilate the Indians and bring an end to tribal life.'

13. Davis, supra note 4, at 465.
14. Id. at 466. A vivid illustration of the changing attitudes toward Native Americans
is supplied by Isaac F. Russel, The Indian Before the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 328 (1908). The
author noted that "[t]he Anglo-Saxon settled [North America] . . . to find a refuge from
political oppression. His first wars were to maintain a foothold against savages, and later for
self defense and national integrity." Id. at 329. Russel elucidated the prevailing wisdom of
his time in advocating the "desirab[ility of] sav[ing] the indian to the civilization of the
future" by gradually assimilating them into mainstream America. Id. at 330. See also
Catherine M. Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, a
Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 661-68 (1994) (placing passage of
the ICWA in the context of the historically "exploitative and inhumane treatment of
American Indians"); Linda J. Lacy, White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327 (1986).
The policy of assimilation was vacated in favor of one allowing for tribal self
determination in 1934. Congress again reversed itself in 1953, and initiated a legislative
scheme aimed toward eliminating any legal distinctions between Indians and people of other
races. This policy was eventually terminated by President Nixon in 1970. At the current
time, the prevailing wisdom advocates support for tribal sovereignty. Philip P. Frickey,
CongressionalIntent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law,
78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1138 n.7 (1990) (citing HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 127206 (R. Strickland ed. 1982)).
Even at the current time, Federal Indian policy is far from cohesive. For example,
federal statutes extend into Indian lands "the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses" committed on government property. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1988).
Excepted, however, are "offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of
another Indian." Id.
15. See Davis, supra note 4, at 465-66; see also Barbara A. Atwood, supra note 12,
at 1052-54. Such policy was not limited to the federal government. Mormon missionaries
have, in the past, sought to "save" Indian children by removing as many as 2,000 a year from
their homes. These parties often obtained parental consent for adoption through fraudulent
means. Patrice Kunesh-Hartman, Comment, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
Protecting Essential Tribal Interests, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 131, 135-36 (1989).
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II. CONTEXT OF THE PASSAGE OF THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

The opening statement of the House Report on the ICWA includes the
following quote: "I can remember [the welfare worker] coming and taking
some of my cousins and friends. I didn't know why and I didn't question
6 Even a cursory
it. It was just done and it had always been done.'
reading of the House Report provides ample demonstration of the fact that
the situation illustrated by this brief passage is precisely the situation
Congress sought to remedy through the passage of the ICWA. Indeed, it
was feared that unless abated, "the wholesale separation of Indian children
from 7 their families" could precipitate the destruction of American Indian
life.1
Congressional surveys of the most current information available
provided a convincing portrayal of the disparate treatment of Indian children
endemic throughout the system of child welfare. In states with large Indian
populations such as Minnesota, South Dakota and Montana, state intervention with Indian children was occurring at a rate that the House of
8
Representatives described as "shocking."'1 In the United States, as many
9
as one in four of Indian children under one year of age were adopted.
Indian children were being placed in foster care at a rate far exceeding their
proportion of the population.2" Large numbers of children were housed in
boarding schools and other government operated facilities."' It was
obvious that Indian children were being separated from their families at a
2
rate many times greater than children of other races. "The steady flow of
a disproportionately high percentage of Indian children from their families
and tribes to non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions
threaten[ed] to deprive tribes of the most basic necessity for their survival--a
next generation. '23 These practices were viewed in the aggregate as being
16. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (testimony of Valencia Thacker before Task
Force 4 of the American Indian Policy Review Commission).
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. id.
21. Id.
22. Id. This separation is especially troubling in light of the fact that prior to
European conquest of North America, there was virtually no such thing as an orphaned
Indian child. Extended families were very much involved in the raising of children, ensuring

that all children were well cared for at all times. Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 8. See also
NATIONAL INDIAN JUSTICE CTR., INDIAN YOUTH AND FAMILY LAW ch. 11, at 6 (1990).

23. Stan Watts, Voluntary Adoptions Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:

Balancing the Interests of Children, Families, and Tribes, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 213, 213
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a form of "cultural genocide. 24
Congress was especially critical of the general standards employed by
the child welfare system in determining the necessity of intervention. 25
One survey cited found that ninety-nine percent of the cases involving the
removal of Indian children from their families were predicated "on such
vague grounds as 'neglect' or 'social deprivation' and on allegations of the
emotional damage the children were subjected to by living with their
parents. ' ,26 Congress was altogether dismayed at the lack of understanding
non-Indian child welfare workers had of Indian family society."
(1989).

24. Marc Mannes, Seeking the Balance Between Child Protection and Family
Preservation in Indian Child Welfare, 72 CHILD WELFARE 141, 143 (Mar.-Apr. 1993).
25. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10-11. See also Ester C. Kim, Note, Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The Contemplation of All, the Best Interests of None,
43 RUTGERS L. REV. 761, 765 (1991).

For a directory of the services currently available to Indian families, see NANCY
GALE, LINKAGES FOR INDIAN CHILD WELFARE PROGRAMS: RESOURCE DIRECTORY (TCI, Inc.
1988); LUCY YOUNES, PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (Nat. Ctr. on Child Abuse and Neglect 1986); LOUISE ZOKAN-DELOS-REYES,
ADOPTION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN CHILD: A MANUAL FOR SOCIAL SERVICE WORKERS

(Nat. Am. Indian Court Judges' Assoc. 1985).
26. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10. That is not to say that neglect or alcohol
abuse are not relevant factors in determining whether parental rights of American Indians
should be terminated. See generally In re D.D.S., 869 P.2d 160 (Alaska 1994); D.E.D. v.
State, 704 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1985); People ex rel J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)
(outlining the process for transfer from state court to tribal court in child neglect proceeding);

People ex rel C.A.J., 709 P.2d 604 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); In re L.F., 880 P.2d 1365 (Mont.
1994) (addressing situation where continued placement of Indian child with mother would
result in child being sexually abused merited foster placement); In re S.D., 402 N.W.2d 346

(S.D. 1987).

27. The House Report stated that:
Indian communities are often shocked to learn thai parents they regard as
excellent caregivers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers .... For
example, the dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood. An
Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are
counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers,
untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially
irresponsible,. consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as
neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights.
Because in some communities the social workers have, in a sense, become
a part of the extended family, parents will sometimes turn to the welfare
department for temporary care of their children, failing to realize that their action
is perceived quite differently by non-Indians.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10. See also JANET SWENSON & GAIL ROSENTHAL, WARM

SPRINGS: A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO RECOGNIZING THE STRENGTHS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE FAMILIES (Am. Academy of Child Psych. 1980). See also In
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Further notation was made regarding the failure of non-Indian judges
28
to understand the differences between Indian culture and that of mainstream America. 29 These judges received additional criticism for exhibiting
a general propensity to accept imprecise definitions of "abuse" and
"neglect," which in turn served to encourage unscrupulous welfare workers
0
seeking to find adoptable children to combat the perceived shortage.
"Instead of evaluating parental behavior in light of Indian cultural standards,
including the preference for extended families as the locus of child care,
child welfare workers and courts were said to 'be1 imposing on Indian
society. 0
families the norms of white, middle class
Congress determined that depriving a child of his or her Indian heritage
was not routinely in that child's best interest. This determination was true
even among children placed at a very young age who grew up knowing only
re Adoption of J.M.F., 881 P.2d 1116, 1117 (Alaska 1994) (addressing the Yupick custom
of "cultural adoption," in which biological parents turn their children over to relatives without
retaining a right to reclaim them).
28. Although there are certain elements common to most Indian cultures, there is a
great deal of variety between the assorted tribes. Linda J. Lacey, The White Man's Law and
the American Indian Family in the Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 328, 330 (1986-87).
The emphasis on the community as opposed to the individual, however, is nearly universal.
See generally Patricia Monture, A Vicious Circle: Child Welfare and the First Nations, 3
CAN. J.WOMEN & LAW 6 (1989). Passage of the ICWA is seen as being in compliance with
the general proclivity of Indian cultures to favor the needs of the community over the needs
of the individual. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child
Welfare Act, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 n.3 (1990).
29. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11.
30. Id. For the current standards employed by the child welfare community in
selecting caseworkers to service the Indian community, see EDWIN SANTIN-GONZALEZ,
DEFINING ENTRY LEVEL COMPETENCIES FOR PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE WORKERS SERVING
INDIAN COMMUNITIES, (Office of Human Development Services/ Office of Am. Ind. Projects,

Ariz. St. Univ. 1989).
31. Joan H. Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: The Indian Child
Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 451, 454-55 (1989).
See also Senate testimony of Chief Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians, cited in Mississippi Bank of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34-35
(1989):
One of the most serious failing [sic] of the present system is that Indian children
are removed from the custody of their natural parents by non-tribal government
authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the cultural and social
premises underlying Indian home life and childrearing. Many of the individuals
who decide the fate of our children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and
at worst contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a
non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.
Id. (citing Hearing on S.1214 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
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white American culture.32 In describing these children, one psychiatrist
concluded his testimony regarding his research of Indian adolescents raised
in white homes by saying that these children grew up to find "that society
was putting on them an identity which they didn't possess and taking from
them an identity that they did possess.
Congress succeeded in making
its complete dissatisfaction with the situation quite apparent prior to the
enactment of the ICWA. s4
III. THE LEGISLATION
In its effort to remedy the aforementioned situation, Congress adopted
procedures derived from the official national policy of encouraging tribal
self determination.35 Underlying this policy is the assumption that "Indian

children are essential tribal resources,3 6 on whom tribal survival depends,
32. University of Minnesota social psychiatrist Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, in testifying
before the United States Senate four years prior to the passage of the Act, synopsized his
findings regarding Indian children raised in a purely white environment as follows:
[T]hey were raised with a white cultural and social identity. They are
raised in a white home. They attended predominately white schools ... and really
came to understand very little about Indian culture ... [fneeling that Indians were
a historical figure but were not a viable contemporary social group.
Then during adolescence, they found that society was not to grant them
the white identity that they had ....
For example, a universal experience was that
when they began to date white children, the parents of the white youngsters were
against this, and there were pressures among white children from the parents not
to date these Indian children ....
Indian Child Welfare Program:Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the
Senate Comin. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1974) [hereinafter
Indian Welfare Program] (quoted in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30, 33 n.1 (1989)).
The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently reaffirmed this viewpoint in In re Custody
of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 1994) (noting that the best interests standard is
"imbued with the values of a majority culture") See also In re N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934 (Alaska
1994) (balancing the benefits to the child's emotional well being that would be served by
placement with non-Indian relatives as opposed to the advantages to his cultural needs by
placement with his tribe).
33. Indian Welfare Program, supra note 32 (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer,
University of Minnesota).
34. Statistical analysis of the effectiveness of the ICWA is contradictory. Plantz et al.,
supra note 8, at 24. Accordingly, a definitive assessment of the usefulness of the Act is
beyond the scope of this article.
35. Hollinger, supra note 31, at 456. See also notes 10-15, supra, and accompanying
text.
36. The ICWA specifically states that "no resource ... is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a
direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children .... " 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1988).
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and hence tribal governing bodies, not parents, should determine the

37
circumstances in which Indian children will be raised." In light of this

policy, Congress enacted "minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families... [as a means to ensure] the placement
of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture."'38 Examples of these standards include: (1)
preference given to members of the child's extended family, other members
of the child's tribe, or other Indian families in any 'placement in state
4° (2) the requirecourt, 39 including foster care or preadoptive placement;
ment that efforts must be made to provide remedial and rehabilitative
programs to prevent the breakup of Indian families prior to foster care
41
placement or termination of parental rights to an Indian child; and, (3) the

37. Hollinger, supra note 31, at 456.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
39. Informal research by one expert indicates that although the Act has been successful
in inspiring more appropriate placements:
[Indian] adults who spent much of their childhood in some form of out-of-home
care who are now establishing a new wave of troubled families, producing a new
cohort of children experiencing difficulties, and forcing child welfare programs to
deal with the placement of their children in out-of-home care. Moreover, in many
cases, children placed in child care eventually wind up returning home to troubled
parents, who, due to limited resources, typically have not received any help since
the placement was made. These parents are ill prepared to deal with their
children's return, and problems tend to resurface quickly. Many of these parents
also end up having more children for whom child welfare services may eventually
have to take responsibility.
Marc Mannes, Seeking the Balance Between Child Protection and Family Preservationin
Indian Child Welfare, 72 CHILD WELFARE 141, 145 (1993). Tribes that have adapted
traditional methods to the requirements of modem child welfare services have had greater
success. Id. See generally Terry L. Cross, Drawing on Cultural Traditionin Indian Child
Welfare Practice, 67 SOCIAL CAsEWORK 283 (1986).
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). Similar policies, albeit policies without the force of
Congressional sanction, affect adoption of Black and other minority children. Hollinger,
supra note 31, at 469 n.88 (citing James B. Boskey, Placing Children For Adoption, in
ADOPTION LAW AND PRAcncE (J.H. Hollinger ed., 1988). For more on this topic, see
generally Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transaction Costs on the Market for Babies, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553 (1994); Kim Forde-Mazmi, Note, Black Identity and Child
Placement: The Best Interests of Black and BiracialChildren, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1994).
Apparently, state agencies have had some difficulty in recruiting Indians to serve as
foster or adoptive parents. Agencies located on Indian reservations, however, have proven
quite successful in abiding by this mandate. Plantz et al., supra note 8, at 27.
41. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Prior to any placement, the parties must satisfy the court that
their efforts to prevent the breakup of the family were indeed unsuccessful. Id. Studies of
the effectiveness of the ICWA indicate that only forty-one percent of such families actually
received the requisite counseling. Plantz et al., supra note 8, at 26.
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necessary evidentiary burden in the termination of parental rights of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" that continued custody of the child is likely to result in
serious emotional of physical harm to the child.4 2
A. DEFINITIONS

The ICWA created adoption standards quite different than those used
in conventional practice.43 Consequently, accurate implementation of the
Act required a precise list of definitions. The Act defines "Indian child" as
being "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe ...

For

the purposes of the ICWA, the "Indian Child's Tribe" is defined as "the
Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or eligible for member-

ship or . . . the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the more
significant contacts . . .",4' An "Indian tribe" is defined as "any Indian

tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians
recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary
(of the Bureau of Indian Affairs) because of their status as Indians . . .
The definition of "Child Custody Proceeding," which is necessary to trigger
implementation of the ICWA,47 includes actions for foster care placement,
termination of parental rights, and adoption proceedings. 48 Child custody
proceedings in which there is no possibility that an Indian child will be
removed from a parent's home are excepted from ICWA. 49 This lone
exception clause covers custody proceedings related to either a divorce
decree or a delinquency proceeding.50
The statutory definition of "Parent" specifically excludes "the unwed

42. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a), (f).
43. For an analysis of standard adoption processes, See Lisa J. Trembly, Note,

Untangling the Adoption Web: New Jersey's Move to Legitimize Independent Adoptions, 18
Seton Hall Legis. J. 371, 376-79 (1993). See also Michael E. Connely, Tribal Jurisdiction
Under Section 1911(b) of the Indian Child Welfare Act, Are States Respecting Indian

Sovereignty?, 23 N.M. L. Rev. 479 (1993).
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(5). The federal government often predicates eligibility for
certain services or programs, i.e., the Indian Financing Act, on tribal membership. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1462.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
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father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established .. .
This exception is in accord with the Supreme Court decisions that generally
confer "parental status" only on those unwed fathers who have established
a paternal relationship with their children.52 While the ICWA fails to
provide a specific method for determining whether a father has established
paternity, courts have generally applied either state or tribal law in making
this determination.5 3
B. JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

In order to prevent reoccurrence of the ills which necessitated the
passage of the ICWA,s4 Congress set forth highly specific jurisdictional
requirements. Pursuant to the Act, the tribe retains exclusive jurisdiction
over all disputes involving children residing in or domiciled within tribal
reservations.55 Tribal courts 56 and state courts possess concurrert jurisdiction in cases involving Indian children who are neither residents nor
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9). See, e.g., In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
52. See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
53. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988). In
this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that:
[C]ongress intended to defer to state of tribal law standards for establishing
paternity, so long as these approaches are permissible variations on the methods of
acknowledging and establishing paternity within the general contemplation of
congress when it passed the ICWA,' and provide a realistic opportunity for an
unwed father to establish an actual or legal relationship with his child ....
Id. (citations omitted).
54. See supra notes 16-34 and accompanying text.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). This jurisdictional requirement had been recognized in the
common law prior to the passage of the ICWA. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court of
Sixteenth Judicial Dist., 424 U.S. 382 (1986). Parental efforts at evading this provision will
be discussed infra at notes 76-161 and accompanying text. See also Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
The word "domicile" is not defined in the Act, the reason being that the term is
presumptively well-defined under state law. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES FOR
STATE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,585 (1979). Some commentators,
however, have argued that the federal definition of domicile should be uniformly applied.
That is, the domicile of the mother is the domicile of the child. See Watts, supra note 23,
at 224. See also Roman Nose v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Servs., 967 F.2d 435, 437
(10th Cir. 1992).
56. Tribal courts are a relatively recent innovation. These courts took various forms
until given some sort of uniformity in accord with the passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934. Atwood, supra note 12, at 1076 n.l 19.
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domiciliaries of the tribal reservation. 7 While the specific language of the
ICWA grants concurrent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
relevant provision to supply a presumption of tribal jurisdiction in such
58
cases.
If a state court retains jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding
involving an Indian child as defined by the Act, the ICWA is fully
applicable and the tribe must be notified,5 9 and has the right to intervene.' Failure to provide notice of the state court proceeding to the tribe
may provide cause for invalidation.6' In cases where the Act is applicable
yet the court chooses to apply state law, a parent or the child's tribe may
move to invalidate any order entered as a result of said proceeding.62
Attorneys who fail to properly abide by the ICWA in facilitating adoptions
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). Disputes between state courts and tribal courts with
concurrent jurisdiction has been described as "[p]erhaps the most undeveloped and frustrating
area of the law .... " Roger M. Baron, Child Custody Jurisdiction, 38 S.D. L. REV. 479,
495 (1993).
As with all provisions of the ICWA, some state courts have enthusiastically sought
to avoid enforcement of these provisions. See, e.g., l re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667
P.2d 228, 233 n.6 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), where the court held that:
[T]he Act does not attempt to preserve a child's right to its Indian heritage under
all circumstances. Congress has specifically limited the Act's coverage to members
of only those Indian tribes which qualify under the ICWA definition of 'Indian
tribe.' Nor does the Act apply to a child of an Indian if the child is not a member
of a tribe or not eligible for membership in a tribe.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36; Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 847 F. Supp. 871, 877
(W.D. Okla. 1994).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). This element of tribal notification is in accord with the
Indian concept of the needs of the tribe being equal to, or in some cases superseding, the
rights of the individual. "Every Indian child belongs to both its 'nuclear' family and to the
tribe." Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 7-8.
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 1914. Studies conducted approximately ten years after the passage
of the ICWA indicate that parents actually received notification only 65% to 70% of those
instances in which such notification was required. Tribes received notification approximately
80% of the time. Plantz et al., supra note 8, at 25.
Accurate statistics on the effectiveness of the ICWA have proven difficult to
compile, since there is no federal auditing or review of agencies charged with implementing
the Act. Debra Ratterman, Judicial Determination of Reasonable Efforts, 15 CHILDREN
TODAY

20, 22 (1986).

62. 25 U.S.C. § 1914. While studies indicate that Indian children are still being placed
at a rate far in excess of that of non-Indian children, increased Tribal intervention has served
to increase the success of permanent placements and decrease the time spent in temporary
placements. Dale M. Wares et al., Job Satisfaction, Practice Skills, and Supervisory Skills
of Administrators of hidian Child Welfare Programs, 71 CHILD WELFARE 405, 406 (1992).
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63
may be subject to civil liability to their client or the tribe.
When discussing concurrent jurisdiction, it is important to note that the
idea of comity generally does not apply between tribal courts and state
courts.64 At least one commentator has suggested that this absence of
mutual recognition between courts encourages child snatching and under65
This situation
mines the security of children and adoptive parents.
to state that
far
as
gone
have
appears to be changing, however. Some
appraisal of "the question of reciprocal recognition between states and Indian
Tribes has become 'fashionable'."66

C. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

As with the jurisdictional requirements, the procedural provisions of the
ICWA differ greatly from those employed in the normal child placement
action. The Act mandates that parental rights cannot be terminated without
evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified
expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent of
Indian custodian 67 is likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the child. 68s Furthermore, temporary removal of children from
63. Trentadue, supra note 10, at 491. Please note, however, that the Act does not
provide a cause of action for monetary damages either to parents or to children when a state
has improperly separated them. The ICWA limits their remedy to declaratory relief.
Fletcher v. State, 858 F. Supp. 169, 173 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
64. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 57, at 495-96 n.l11 (citing S.D.C.L. § 1-1-25 (1992),
which provides that "[n]o order or judgment of a tribal court in the state of South Dakota
may be recognized as a matter of comity in the state courts of South Dakota ...." except
under certain specifically enumerated circumstances). Adoption decrees are not among those
provisions included in the South Dakota statute.
For a more complete discussion of this element of the relationship between tribal
courts and state courts, see Atwood, supra note 12, at 1065-73. See generally William V.
Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories:"Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W.
L. REv. 219 (1987).
65. Baron, supra note 57, at 497-98.
66. P.S. Deloria & Robert Lawrence, Negotiating Tribal- State Full Faith and Credit
Agreements, the Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV.
365, 367 (1994).
67. An Indian custodian is defined as any Indian person who retains custody of an
Indian child through mechanisms of state or tribal law or custom. A person may become a
custodian through an informal transfer of children if the parent does not seek to regain
custody. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). Expert psychiatric testimony regarding family matters is not
always well received by courts. See, e.g., Lyndabury v. Lyndabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1118
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (describing such testimony as "represent[ing the penultimate grey
area."). Id. (Jorgensen, J., dissenting). The apparent source of this uneasiness is the fear that
the court will be unable to exploit the witness' expertise without allowing the expert to

1994:81]

INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

the parental home by state agencies is impermissible absent "clear and
convincing evidence [that] serious emotional or physical damage" is the
likely result of a child's continued maintenance in the parental home.69
The ICWA includes further provisions in response to the congressional
findings of rampant fraud and duress in the termination of Indian parental
rights. The termination provisions of this federal statute are, as a consequence, generally much more favorable to biological parents than most state
laws.7" Specifically, the Act mandates that prior to voluntary termination,

parental consent must be executed in writing and recorded before a judge.7"
Furthermore, the Indian parents may withdraw consent, for any reason, prior

to the entry of the final decree.72 In fact, parents may withdraw consent
even after the entry of the final judgment in cases involving fraud or
duress.7 3 In proceedings for involuntary termination, both the parents74
and the child's tribe are entitled to notice.75
In cases involving procedurally defective termination, the remedies
available to the tribe may supersede those of either the birth parents or the
adoptive parents. The tribe has an apparently indefinite amount of time to
seek vacation of an adoption decree based on procedural deficiencies, such
as lack of notice.76 While the Act is somewhat vague in defining exactly
which type of proceedings require tribal notice, state courts generally allow
tribal intervention in all cases.77 In these instances, the child will be
commandeer the role of the fact finder. Marianne Wesson, HistoricalTruth, Narrative Truth,
and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REv. 331, 332 (1985) (cited in Brian D. Gallagher,
Note, Damages, Duress, and the Discovery Rule: The Statutory Right of Recovery of Victims
of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 17 SEroN HALL LEGIS. J. 505, 536 n.186 (1993)).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). This provision appears to have been included in direct
response to Congressional findings of widespread misconduct in Indian child placement. See
infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text for discussion of Congressional findings published
in HoUSE REPORT at 9.
70. Davis, supra note 4, at 475.
71. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a). This provision, also, is in apparent recognition of the belief
that "[m]any of the same harms associated with involuntary removal are potentially present
in voluntary proceedings. Indian parents may have strong economic, religious, or social
incentives to consent to adoptions." Watts, supra note 23, at 214.
72. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c).
73. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d).
74. Under the ICWA, notice by publication to parents whose rights the state is seeking
to terminate is insufficient. In re L.A.M., 727 P.2d 1057 (Alaska 1986).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
76. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). See generally Hollinger, supra note 31, at 453.
77. Hollinger, supra note 31, at 463. The Act does not define the authority of the
Tribe upon intervention. It has been generally assumed, however, that the tribe's authority
in preventing an involuntary termination supersedes that of the state. In cases involving
voluntary termination, although the tribe cannot prohibit a parent from putting a child up for
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returned to the birth parents or Indian custodians pending the determination
of the merits of the claim.78
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Despite the aggressive stance taken by Congress in its passage of the
7 9 As stated in the
ICWA, "state courts frequently avoid its application.
preceding section, the Act is often much more zealous in its protection of
the rights of biological parents than state adoption laws. Additionally,
application of the ICWA compels state courts to recognize the child's
extended family, a concept foreign to most adoption proceedings. Accordingly, much of the litigation involving the ICWA centers on attempts to
avoid employing the strict standards of the Act.
The only opportunity the Supreme Court has taken to interpret the
ICWA directly involves the issue of parental attempts to avoid its application in the voluntary placement of their children. The parties in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield0 were an unmarried Indian couple
who were residents and domiciliaries of the appellant's reservation, and their
8
twin children born approximately 200 miles from that reservation. ' The
parents quickly arranged for the children's adoption with the Mississippi
state authorities and that state's Chancery court.8 2 A final adoption decree,
which made no reference to either the ICWA or the twin's Indian heritage,
Orrey Holyfield when the
was signed by the court in favor of Vivian and
83
children were approximately one month old.
The Band of Choctaw Indians (hereinafter "the Band") moved in state
Chancery court to vacate the adoption approximately two months later, on
84
the basis that the ICWA granted the Tribal Court exclusive jurisdiction.
The state court denied the motion, citing the efforts of the parents to ensure
adoption, the tribe acts as an equal third party, along with the parents, in deciding appropriate
placement. Id. at 464.
78. See id. See also Jay Matthews, Over Mother's Protest, Navajo Baby is Returned
to Tribe in Bid to Cut Adoptions, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1988, at A3.

79. Davis, supra note 4, at 475; see also Watts, supra note 23, at 215. See, e.g., In
re J.B., 643 P.2d 306 (Okla. 1982) (rejecting use of the ICWA); lI re Adoption of Halloway,
732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) (overruling trial court's ruling that voluntary placement gave state
court exclusive jurisdiction, invalidating six year old adoption decree and returning child to

Navajo tribe).
80. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
81. Id. at 37. The parents purportedly chose the twins' birthplace in an attempt to
avoid the ICWA. Id. at 39 (citing opinion of Mississippi trial court).
82. Id. at 38.
83. Id. at 37-38.
84. Id. at 38.
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that the children were born off the reservation, and the fact that neither of
the children had ever physically been on their ancestral home. 85 The
Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed for primarily the same reasons.8 6
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, reversed. 87
After extensive discussion of the notion of domicile, 88 the Court
determined that since it was "undisputed... that the domicile of the mother
(as well as the father) had been, at all relevant times, on the Choctaw
Reservation .... Thus, it is clear that at their birth the twin babies were
also domiciled on the reservation, even though they themselves had never
been there." 9 The Court disposed of the second justification for the State
court's holding in stating that the fact that the mother acted voluntarily was
irrelevant, since Congress had acted with concern "not solely about the
interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the
tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by nonIndians."" Consequently, the court declared that "[t]ribal jurisdiction
under § 1911(a) was not meant to be defeated by the actions of individual
members of the tribe."9' The Court further noted that Congress worded the
ICWA precisely as it did in response to its concerns that parties to child
custody proceedings would attempt to circumvent the Act through unilateral
action. 92
In concluding its opinion, the Court addressed the issue of bonding.
The twins were over three years old at the time of the Holyfield decision.93
While issuing a thinly veiled recommendation to the tribal court, with
85. Id. at 39.
86. Id. See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511 So. 2d 918
(Miss. 1987) (the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion).
87. Id. at 41.
88. Id. at 39-48.
89. Id. at 48-49. The Court further clarified this holding in a statement which conflicts
with the published guidelines of the Bureau of Indian Affairs:
[t]he statement of the Supreme Court of Mississippi that 'at no point in time can
it be said the twins . . .were domiciled within the territory set aside for the
reservation,' may be a correct statement of that State's law of domicile, but it is
inconsistent with generally accepted doctrine in this country and cannot be what
Congress had in mind when it used the term in the ICWA.
Id. at 49 (quoting Mississippi Band Of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511 So. 2d at 921).
The Court was sure to point out that the guidelines of the Bureau of Indian Affairs are "nonbinding." Id. at 51 n.26. The Court later noted that no children are actually born on the
Choctaw reservation, since the Band lacked appropriate facilities. Id. at 52 n.27.
90. Id. at 49.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 51-52.
93. Id. at 53-54.
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emphasis upon "considerable pain" that would result if the twins were
separated from "the only family they had ever known," the Court acknowl94
edged that only the tribal court had jurisdiction over the placement.
Consequently, the children's fate was solely within the discretion of the
Tribal Court.95 The Supreme Court thereby determined that the mandates
of the ICWA are to be strictly enforced as a means of accomplishing the
96
goals Congress articulated in its pre-passage reports.
Nevertheless, contrary to both the Supreme Court's directive and the
97
general rules of statutory construction, Indians and non-Indians alike seek
to avoid the ICWA. One popular tool employed in averting employment of
the Act which has remained viable in the post Holyfield world is the
Existing Indian Family Exception. 9 In contravention of both the express
language of the Act and Holyfield, some jurists have held that the ICWA is
applicable only in those instances where an Indian child is removed from an
99
While proponents of this
existing Indian family, home, or culture.
exception state that the language of the Act is sufficiently broad to embrace
their inte.pretation,'O° opponents argue that emasculating the ICWA in this
manner is contrary to both the plain language of the statute and its stated
94. Id.
95. Id. The Court, perhaps angry at being placed in that awkward position, noted that
"[h]ad the mandate of the ICWA been followed in 1986, of course, much potential anguish
might have been avoided ...." Id.
96. Id. Research has failed to uncover the result of the tribal court decision regarding
twins' custody.
Holyfield
the
97. Generally, courts are instructed to interpret statutes strictly as written, absent
blatant ambiguity. Failure to do so usurps the constitutionally created power of the Congress.
WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 8 (2d ed. 1984).
98. Davis, supra note 4, at 475. As the title implies, Davis' article provides a
complete analysis of this particular exception.
It is important to note at this time that the Existing Family exception was not
addressed in Holyfield. "Nevertheless, subsequent lower court decisions and party claims
both defeating and supporting the existing Indian family exception have relied on its ruling."
Id. at 477.
99. Id. The appropriateness of judicial alteration of the ICWA is not universally
accepted. In August 1994, the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to create a "good cause"
exception to the Act. In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994). See also
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE AcT, 16 THE GUARDIAN 6 (Fall 1994).
100. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), where the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that the ICWA was not intended:
to dictate that an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian
home or culture, and probably never would be, should be removed from its primary
cultural heritage (that of the baby's white mother) and placed in an Indian
environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother.
Id. at 175.
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purposes." °1 The latter representation appears to be supported by both the

strong language which pervades the pre-passage congressional reports, as

well as the fact that the ICWA provides only two specifically enumerated
exceptions."
The Existing Family exception has been exercised in a wide variety of
circumstances by both Indians and non-Indians, as a means of circumventing
the ICWA and effectively removing the tribe from the equation. 103
Admittedly, unflinching application of the Act may seem inequitable under
certain circumstances. In recognition of this dilemma, both federal and state

courts have confronted this situation in a number of ways.

One such problem was presented before the Supreme Court of Kansas
by the litigation underlying In re Adoption of Baby Boy L," a case
involving the adoption of the illegitimate child of a Kiowa Indian father and
an non-Indian mother."3 The father, who was 5/8 Kiowa Indian yet was
duly enrolled as a member of his tribe, was incarcerated at the time of his
son's birth."° With the consent of the mother, the baby was placed for
adoption shortly after his birth, and the adoption proceeding was commenced in state court without implementation of the ICWA.' ° The father
contested this adoption, but his motion in opposition was denied by the state
court. 108

The court based its denial on the judicially created Existing Family
Exception to the Act. Specifically, the court noted that

101. Davis, supra note 4, at 476.
102. Id. at 476-77.
103. Id. at 477. See also In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982);
In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992);
In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d
650 (S.D. 1987). Davis, a tutor at the Yale University School of Law, has identified four
separate scenarios in which the Existing Family exception has been employed for this reason.
104. See generally In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982). The
Kiowa tribe unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court
to Federal Court. The Tenth Circuit upheld the ruling of the District Court of Kansas,
agreeing that the state court's decision was not so fundamentally flawed as to require federal
intervention. Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
872 (1986).
In other circumstances, Indian tribes have had success in appealing to the federal
judiciary when state courts have usurped tribal authority. See, e.g., New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
105. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 643 P.2d at 172.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 172-73.
108. Id. at 173.
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careful study of the legislative history behind the Act..
. discloses that the overriding concern of Congress ...
was the maintenance of the family and tribal relationships
existing in Indian homes ....It was not to dictate that an
illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an
Indian home or culture, and probably never would be,
should be removed from its primary cultural heritage and
placed in an Indian environment over the express objections of its non-Indian mother."°
Further discussion of the circumstances surrounding the case evinces the
court's recognition that, if applied as drafted, the ICWA applied to the case
before them. 10 Nonetheless, the court determined that the equities
surrounding that litigation precluded the Act's application.'
The court's use of the Existing Family exception in this instance
allowed it to avoid addressing the validity of a existing placement made
under state law." 2 The potentially disastrous effect of upsetting such
placements has been indeed well documented." 3 Nonetheless, in many
instances, adoptive parents run the risk that their seemingly legitimate state
court's failure to abide by the
court adoptions may be invalidated due to the
14
jurisdictional requirements of the ICWA."
Even in light of the Holyfield decision, the reasoning of the Kansas
Supreme Court has certainly proven quite durable, especially in cases where

109. Id. at 175.

110. Id. at 175-79. The court seemed especially impressed by the fact that the mother,
who gave full consent to the adoption, was herself not of Indian decent. Id. at 174.
111. Id.at 177.
112. Id. at 175. The child was approximately 14 months old at the time of the decision,
and had lived his whole life with his adoptive family. Id.
113. See, e.g., William Raspberry, Wisdom of Solomon Useless to Jessica, HOUSTON
CHRON., Aug. 5, 1993, at A28; see also Adoption Refonners Hope to Add Kids Interest Into
Law (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 27, 1993) (transcript available on LEXIS, News
library).
The recent cases involving "Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard" have brought this fact
to the forefront of American Consciousness. In fact, the public debate of these cases has
been eclipsed perhaps only by the "Whitewater" and "O.J. Simpson" cases. While direct
analysis of legal attacks on supposedly concluded adoption proceedings is beyond the scope
of this article, the unpleasant effects of appellate litigation concerning adoption cases is
confronted passin.
114. Watts, supra note 23, at 215 (citing hire Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962
(Utah 1986), where the state supreme court invalidated a six year old adoption decree on the
basis that the trial court had improperly retained jurisdiction).
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the child has not been exposed to his Indian heritage."' S.A. v.E.J.P. 6
evolved out of a situation where a non-Indian mother sought to place her
illegitimate child for adoption. As in Baby Boy L., several factors
influenced the court to employ the Existing Family Exception. Of particular
consequence was the fact that the father, although he had acknowledged his
paternity, had never supported the child, exercised any parental responsibilities or lived with the mother; the child had no real contact with her father;
and the child never had any opportunity to participate in the life of the
tribe. "7
Furthermore, the father's Indian derivation was relatively
slight."'
Some states," 9 including New Jersey, have declined to accept the
judicially created exceptions to the ICWA. When confronted with a
situation factually akin to Baby Boy L., the unanimous New Jersey Supreme
Court in In re Adoption of A Child of Indian Heritage 20 held that the fact
that a child had never lived on an Indian reservation did not preclude the
2
application of the ICWA to his adoption.1 1

115. Davis, supra note 4, at 480.
116. 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
117. Id. at 1189.
118. The father was only one-eighth Cherokee. Id. at 1188. See also In re Adoption
of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 974 (Alaska 1989) (noting that father of illegitimate child was only
1/32 Chickasaw and mother was of non-Indian heritage); In re Adoption of Baby L., 643
P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982) (noting that the child was only 5/16 Kiowa).
119. See generally In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1991);
In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re Adoption of Baade, 462
N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990); In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
One especially interesting situation is represented by the apparent change of heart
regarding the plain language ICWA by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. Prior to the
Holyfield decision, the court in Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987), held that the
ICWA did not apply to adoptions involving illegitimate children of Indian heritage if such
a child had never lived in an Indian home. Id. at 653. Three years later, and one year after
Holyfield, that same court held that the Act applies any time an "'Indian child' is the subject
of a 'child custody proceeding' as those terms are defined in the Act.'' In re Adoption of
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990) (citing In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage,
543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988)). See also Davis, supra note 4, at 483-85.
120. 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988). This case was cited with approval in the Supreme
Court's decision in Holyfield.
121. Id. at 927-28. The.New Jersey court declined to upset a three year old adoption
decree in which the ICWA was not specifically addressed. Id. Apparently, the court
determined that the biological father and his attorney were raising factual discrepancies
sincerely for the purpose of vacating the adoption, despite the mother's compliance with the
dictates of the Act. Nonetheless, the court determined that since the methods used by the
superior court in granting the adoption were not repulsive to the Act, the adoption was
properly granted. Id.
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Both birth parents were Sioux Indians who were not domiciliaries of
an Indian reservation. 22 When the mother went into labor, the father left
1 23
to visit relatives. Accordingly, he had never seen his biological son.
Much of the facts relating to the adoption were contested. 24 Nonetheless,
since both the father and the tribe had received the requisite notification and
since the father had declined to establish his paternity as required by the
Act, the adoption decree was upheld.
While considering a case factually distinguishable from those cases in
which the Existing Family Exception was exercised, the court in In re
Adoption of Lindsay C.," was nonetheless critical of the manner in which
many earlier courts had balanced the competing interests in adoption cases.
The baby's Indian father and his non-Indian mother had no relationship
outside of their sexual encounter that produced Lindsay.' 26 Although the
father's mother held the child out as her granddaughter during occasional
visits, the father never claimed the child as his daughter.' 27 Upon her
marriage to another man, the child's mother sought to terminate the
biological father's paternal rights. The father received notice of that action,
and declined to contest the adoption. 2 8
The father's tribe, however, did not receive notice. 29 The father used
this fact at a later date to contest the termination of his parental rights,
despite his prior consent.' 30 The state supreme court agreed with his
position, determining that the tribal court had sole jurisdiction over the
termination case. 13' The Lindsay C. court went as far as to say that
"Holyfield has raised new questions regarding the continuing viability of
Baby Boy L. and its progeny .... Baby Boy L. may have given inappropriate weight to the wishes of the family" and allotted insufficient importance
to the interests of the tribe. 32 In rendering its decision, the court took
special notice of that portion of the Holyfield opinion related to the
balancing of the parties interests. Specifically:

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 928.
Id.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld. at 198.
Id. at 200-01.
Id. at 199.
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Tribal jurisdiction under [the ICWA] was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe,
for Congress was concerned not solely about the interests
of Indian children and families, but also about the impact
on the tribes themselves of the large number of Indian
children adopted by non-Indians.' 33
Since the case before them was a child custody proceeding involving an
Indian child and the proceeding did not fit within one of the ICWA's
specifically enumerated exceptions, the ICWA was determined to be
applicable.' 34 No independent basis for disregarding the mandates of the
Act was uncovered.' 35 Since Holyfield, the movement toward strict
interpretation of the ICWA appears to be gaining momentum. The Supreme
Court of South Dakota noted this sentiment in holding that "pre-Holyfield
state court cases ... are now doubtful authority, and ... [the] ICWA has
effect even when the Indian child has never been raised in an Indian
home. 36 It went on to say that "No amount of probing into what Congress 'intended' can alter what Congress said, in plain English, at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1904(4)."'" 3 As stated by the Supreme Court of Alaska:
serious policy reservations concerning the creation of
judicial exceptions to the plain language of the ICWA..
. . Moreover, these judicially created exceptions to the
coverage of the ICWA are somewhat suspect in light of
133. In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (quoting Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989).
134. Id. at 201.
135. Id. Nevertheless, the court took pains to note that the decision of whether the tribe
should intervene was purely an internal matter. The court took no position on whether tribal
intervention was either warranted or appropriate. Id.
136. In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 101 (S.D. 1991).
137. Id. at n.6. This is not to say that all state courts waited until after the Holyfield
decision to voice their opposition to the Existing Family Exception. In a pre-Holyfield case
involving a pair of non-Indian maternal grandparents seeking custody of their daughter's
illegitimate half-Indian child, a Washington court succinctly stated that while the grandparents had "asserted that the Act does not apply where the child had never been part of any
Indian family relationship ... the language of the Act contains no such exception, and the
Browns have presented no compelling reason to create one." In re Custody of S.B.R., 719
P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). See also In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983), where a California appellate court overturned a lower court's application of
the Existing Family Exception in stating that "the trial court predicated its decision not to
apply the Act in part on its determination that the minor had developed no identification as
an Indian. The language of the Act contains no such exception to its applicability, and we
do not deem it appropriate to create one judicially." Id.
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the Act's purpose of imposing federal procedural safeguards. State courts must be particularly hesitant in
creating judicial exceptions to a federal act which was
treatment of
enacted to counter state courts' prejudicial
38
Indian children and communities.'
Further justification for the rejection of the Existing Family exception
39
The New Jersey
has been found in the legislative history of the ICWA.
that:
holding
in
tract
this
just
Supreme Court adopted
[W]hile an unwed mother might have a legitimate and
genuine interest in placing her child for adoption outside
of an Indian environment, if she believes that such a
placement is in the child's best interests, consideration
must also be given to the rights of the child's father and
Congress' belief that, whenever possible, it is in an Indian
child's best interests to maintain a relationship with his or
her tribe."o
The Crystal K. court was also persuaded by the Congressional findings that
removal of an Indian child from his cultural foundation was, generally,
contrary to that child's best interests. 4 '
Despite the current tide of precedent, the Existing Family exception has
in some quarters received favorable sanction as a means to avoid the
invalidation of an otherwise successful adoption. Some mothers have sought
to use the ICWA to invalidate consensual adoption of their Indian children
by non-Indian families. Recent cases have spurred national debate on the
propriety of allowing birth mothers to rescind their permission once an

138. Iz re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977-78 (Alaska 1989). T.N.F. is certainly
the most unusual case involving the ICWA. A 1/32 Chickasaw Indian man and his nonIndian wife made a surrogacy contract with his non-Indian sister-in-law and her non-Indian
husband. Everything proceeded normally, until the surrogate mother sought to regain custody
of the child some three years after the child's birth, based on the fact that the state court had
not applied the ICWA to the adoption. The Chickasaw Indians had not sought intervention.
The Alaska Supreme Court invalidated the adoption, and remanded the case, stating that
although implementation of the ICWA served to thwart the best interests of the only Indian
participant in that particular instance, the greater good of all Indians and tribes would be
undercut should the court allow an exception to be made to the Act.
139. See supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
140. In re Adoption of A Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1988).
141. In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citing HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 11).
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adoption has taken place. 42 The use of the ICWA as a mechanism for
birth mothers to retrieve their children has mixed success.
Different courts have employed varying means to avoid disruption of
existing families with adopted Indian children. The case of In re Adoption
of T.R.M. 43 involved a suit brought by an Indian biological mother to
invalidate the admittedly consensual adoption of her Indian child, which
took place approximately five days after the birth. Within the first year of
the child's life, the mother sought the aid of the tribe in retrieving her baby
on the grounds that the state court did not apply the ICWA to the adoption
proceedings. 144 As might be expected, the case took seven years to reach
the Indiana Supreme Court. 14 5 The court upheld the adoption as valid,
holding that the ICWA was inapplicable since the child, except for her first
five days, was never part of an Indian family. 46 The single overwhelming
factor, however, was the fact that the seven year old child had spent her
entire life with
one family, her Indian heritage was viewed as being almost
47
irrelevant. 1
Post-Holyfield, however, even the Supreme Court of Indiana has taken
strides to ensure literal application of the ICWA. A factually similar case
was recently heard by that court, and a contrary solution realized. 48 In
re D.S. upheld the validity of the Existing Family exception in some quarters. 49 In cases involving Indian mothers seeking to nullify their own
unilateral actions, the court found a presumption of an existing Indian family
prior to the adoption. 50 Accordingly, the case was remanded, with
instructions to the trial court to apply the ICWA as written. 5
The ICWA has served as a convenient, albeit usually unsuccessful,
means for biological mothers seeking to rescind consent to the adoption of
their children.' 5 2 The Supreme Court of Washington was recently con-

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

(1989).

See supra note 110.
525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
Id. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 303.
See Davis, supra note 4, at 487.
In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991).
Id. at 574.
Id. See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30

151. In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d at 575-76.
152. See generally In re Johanson, 402 N.W.2d 13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing
birth mother who actively sought acceptance into several Indian tribes as a means of
attacking her consent to an adoption well after the voluntary termination had taken place);
In re Adoption of Quinn, 881 P.2d 795 (Or. 1994) (stating that the Act was not applicable
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fronted with a mother seeking to employ the ICWA in such a manner
despite the fact that she was unaware of her own Indian heritage until after
she sought legal assistance to revoke her consent. As with the afforecited
cases, In re Adoption of Crews153 involved a young single mother seeking
to challenge the consensual adoption. Both the mother and the non-Indian
father had consented to the adoption, which proceeded without incident in
state court. 54 The mother, without the participation of the father, later
The
changed her mind and fought to have the adoption invalidated.'
court, persuaded by the child's attenuated connection to his Indian heritage,
held that the reversal of his adoption would in no way serve to further the
stated goals of the ICWA. 56 While, this approach is laudable in its
recognition of the concept of bonding,'57 as well as the effort to overcome
an apparent sham, it must be noted that such action is wholly outside the
parameters of the ICWA.
Courts are split over the applicability of the Act to adoptions between
members of extended Indian families.'5 8 The Supreme Court of Alaska
has held that the ICWA applies to all Indian children, regardless of whether
the adoptive parents are Indians, even if the new .parents are members of the
biological mother's family.' 59 In Montana, however, the state supreme
when birth mother was unable to present sufficient evidence that the child was an Indian
within the meaning of the Act). See also In re Marcus S., 638 A.2d 1158 (Me. 1994)
(determining that a non-Indian mother's Due Process rights were not violated simply because
the state's child welfare act was not as strident in protecting a birth mother's rights as the
ICWA).
It may be perhaps more accurate to state that such efforts have met with mixed
success. See, e.g., Jim Merriner, Boy Returned to Mother Who Cited Indian Law, ClI. SUNTIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at 5 (describing the voluntary return of a three month old boy by his
adoptive parents to his Indian birth mother); Andrew Fegelman, Adoptive Couple Agrees to
Give Up Infant, CHI. TRIB. Feb. 2, 1995, at 4; Lou Oritz, Morn Sues to Reverse Son's
Adoption, Indian Child Welfare Act Cited, CHI. SUN-TIMES Jan. 4, 1995, at 14.
153. 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
154. Id. at 307-10.
155. Id. at 307.
156. Id. at 310.
157. See generally In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re
Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988) (noting that six year old Indian Child's
bonding with non-Indian adoptive parents with whom he had spent his entire life constitutes
good cause for denying request for transfer of jurisdiction to trial court).
158. See Davis, supra note 4, at 490-94.
159. A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982). At least one court has noted this
split in authority as to whether the ICWA applies to "intra family" disputes as in In re
Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980). In In re O.G.M., 808 P.2d 684 (Okla. 1991), the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that since an express exception in a statute excludes all
other exceptions, "recognition of a third exception (in addition to those two expressly
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court held that the Act was not intended to apply to all Indian adoptions, but
only those in which there was a danger of removing a child from Indian
culture."W The Montana Supreme Court thereby declined to upset an
adoption of an Indian child by another member of his biological mother's
Indian fiamily, regardless of the state trial court's failure to apply the
ICWA.' 6 '
V.

CONCLUSION

Any conclusive statement regarding the effectiveness of the ICWA
seems inappropriate in light of the disparate treatment accorded Indian
adoptions by the courts of this country's fifty states. The ICWA is a federal
statute, applicable to each of those states, yet susceptible to incompatible
interpretations by each court. Consequently, a definitive statement on the
success, failure, or any other element of the ICWA would be presumptuous.
Furthermore, analysis of litigation centered around adoption provides a poor
picture of the realities of the process."' Most adoptions turn out successfully.' 63 Adoptions are litigated only when something goes wrong. Such
cases merit appeal and publication only when something has gone very
wrong. To the casual observer, the appellate process serves to compound
the wrong via its inherent delays and adherence to legal principles which
often seem contrary to a person's basic concept of fairness. Mindful of the
problems inherent in legalistic analysis of an adoption statute, it suffices to
say that, as a general rule, the Act is an appropriate response to an obvious
problem.
Nonetheless, the need to circumvent the ICWA seems genuinely
equitable in certain situations. On the other hand, attempts to avoid
application of the Act often appear to be predicated on laziness rather than
equity. This desire to avoid the ICWA is also based, at least in part, on
the failure to recognize that the best interest of Indian children may not
necessarily mirror those of children in mainstream America. The Act
embodies an attempt to intertwine the best interests of Indian children and

enumerated by Congress in the ICWA) that the Act will not apply to intra family custody
disputes, would require judicial legislation rather than statutory interpretation." Id. at 688.
See also Comanche Indian Tribe v. Horvis, 847 F. Supp. 871, 876 n.4 (W.D. Okla. 1994);

In re A.K.H. 502 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Minn. 1993).

160. In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d at 129-30.
161. Id.
162. Karen L. Kendall, Courts Cannot Rule Beyond the Law, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1995,
at 22 (Op-Ed piece).
163. See generally, Trembly, supra note 43.

NORTHERN ILLNOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

f[Vol. 15

the best interest of the Indian tribe, in recognition that one is necessarily
dependent upon the other. 64
At least one commentator has argued that the twin goals of promoting
the best interests of Indian children while acting to ensure the stability and
continued existence of Indian tribes and families are mutually exclusive.' 65
This opinion is in direct opposition to that voiced by Congress in the
Act.1 " It is obvious that the ICWA does not work in every instance.
Nevertheless, it remains a satisfactory response to an unpleasant situation.
Therefore, its continuing vitality appears crucial to the survival of the Indian
nations and their way of life.

164. Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 4.
165. Kim, supra note 25, at 793.
166. Watts, supra note 23, at 226 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)). See also note 5, supra,
and accompanying text.

